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You Can’t Be Happier than Your Wife: 
Happiness Gaps and Divorce 
 
This paper asks whether the gap in subjective happiness between spouses matters per se, 
i.e. whether it predicts divorce. We use three panel databases to explore this question. 
Controlling for the level of life satisfaction of spouses, we find that a higher satisfaction gap, 
even in the first year of marriage, increases the likelihood of a future separation. We interpret 
this as the effect of comparisons of well-being between spouses, i.e. aversion to unequal 
sharing of wellbeing inside couples. To our knowledge, this effect has never been taken into 
account by existing economic models of the household. The relation between happiness 
gaps and divorce may be due to the fact that couples which are unable to transfer utility are 
more at risk than others. It may also be the case that assortative mating in terms of 
happiness baseline-level reduces the risk of separation. However, we show that assortative 
mating is not the end of the story. First, our results hold in fixed-effects estimates that take 
away the effect of the initial quality of the match between spouses: fixed-effects estimates 
suggest that a widening of the happiness gap over time raises the risk of separation. Second, 
we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness gaps: couples are more likely to break-
up when the difference in life satisfaction is unfavourable to the wife. The information 
available in the Australian survey reveals that divorces are indeed predominantly initiated by 
women, and importantly, by women who are unhappier than their husband. Hence, 
happiness gaps seem to matter to spouses, not only because they reflect a mismatch in 
terms of baseline happiness, but because they matter as such. 
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1. Introduction   
Are people averse to welfare inequality? Are they making happiness comparisons? Is this 
taking place even within couples? Based on three different panel datasets, this paper suggests 
that this is indeed the case. Controlling for the level of well-being
1 of spouses, as well as their 
income, age, number of children and other characteristics that have been found to associated 
with marriage stability, we find that a higher happiness gap between spouses increases the risk 
of divorce. We take this as a piece of evidence that people care for the distribution of well-
being per se. This issue is the main motivation of the paper. 
Income comparisons, status effects, as well as aversion to income inequality in general, have 
been widely documented, especially in the realm of the labor market, but also in society as a 
whole (see Clark et al., 2008 and Senik, 2009). Yet, the ultimate interest of researchers, 
policy-makers and human beings in general lies in well-being, not in income per se. The usual 
focus on income is because income, as opposed to well-being, is an observable proxy and a 
metric of well-being, not only for researchers, but also in the daily experience of individuals, 
workers and citizens. However, in small organizations, in which people are involved into 
frequent, repeated and long term relationships, well-being could to a certain degree be 
observable. Couples are obviously an extreme case of this type of situations and it has 
actually been shown that spouses are able to predict each other’s declared happiness (Sandvik 
et al., 1993). Actually, couples represent one of the rare real life groups (as opposed to 
                                                 
1 Here we use indifferently the terms well-being, life-satisfaction or happiness, and we assume that these three 
self-declared mental states are approximations of experienced utility (as opposed to decision-utility, which is 
unobservable, see Kahneman et al., 1997.). De facto, these measures are highly correlated. For instance, the 
correlation between self-declared life satisfaction and self-declared happiness, both measured on a 1-10 ladder, is 




experimental settings) in which researchers can be quite certain about the direction of 
comparisons that potentially occur between agents. 
The second motivation of the paper is to contribute to the literature on marriage, divorce, and 
interactions inside couples. To our our knowledge, the hypothesis that there may exist a 
preference for more equal sharing of utility among spouses has never been explored. 
Although marriage and divorce may appear as ultimately private matters, they actually bear 
important implications in terms economic outcomes. For instance, as suggested by Becker et 
al. (1977), the perspective of separation reduces the incentives of spouses to invest in 
marriage specific assets such as the number and human capital of children. Divorce is also 
related, both as a cause and a consequence, to the participation of women in the labor market. 
Marriage and divorce and the regulations that relate to them thus have a potential influence on 
these important aspects of economic life. 
The third objective of the paper has to do with the reliability of subjective variables. Showing 
that self-declared happiness actually has a predictive power on decisions and actions can 
strengthen the idea that it reflects more than the noise produced by mood, social desirability 
biases, framework effects, question ordering and other unessential phenomena. In the same 
spirit, Freeman (1978), Clark (2001), and Kristensen and Westergaard-Nielsen (2006) have 
shown that job satisfaction is a strong predictor of job quits, even when controlling for wages, 
hours of work and other standard individual and job variables. 
We use three panel databases that contain a life satisfaction question labelled in a very similar 
way. The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1984-2007), the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS, 1996-2007) and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia 
Survey (HILDA, 2001-2007). The two former have been widely used by the scientific 
community, especially in the field of happiness economics.  
We find that a happiness gap between spouses in any given year is positively associated with 
the likelihood that a separation occurs in the following year. In order to mitigate concerns 
about reverse causation, we show that even a happiness gap in the first year of marriage (for 
couples who were surveyed during their first year of marriage) increases the risk of a 
separation in any of the subsequent years in which individuals are observed. We interpret this 
finding as resulting from an aversion to unequal sharing of well-being inside couples. One 
explanation may be that couples that are unable to transfer utility are more at risk than  
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others. It may also be the case that assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline-level 
reduces the risk of divorce. However, we show that assortative mating is not the end of the 
story. First, our results hold in fixed-effects estimates that take away the effect of the initial 
quality of the match between spouses: fixed-effects estimates suggest that a widening of the 
happiness gap through time raises the risk of separation. We also find that, after controlling 
for the lagged values of the happiness gap, the coefficient on the current happiness gap is still 
statistically significant, which we interpret as a sign that the effect goes beyond assortative 
mating. 
Finally, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of happiness gaps: the latter increase the risk 
of separation when the wife is less happy than her husband, but the reverse is not true. The 
information available in the Australian survey reveals that divorces are indeed predominantly 
initiated by women. It also shows that women who report to be the initiator for divorce were 
actually less happy than their husbands, whereas this is not the case when the separation was 
initiated by the husband or by both spouses. 
Hence, happiness gaps seem to matter to spouses, not only because they reflect a mismatch in 
terms of baseline happiness, but because they matter as such. 
2. Happiness gaps and divorce in the economic literature 
This paper belongs to the economic analysis of marriage and divorce. This literature has 
focused on the reasons for marriage
2, on the cause of marriage instability, on the behavior of 
spouses in terms of demand for goods and supply of labor, on the efficiency of the 
equilibrium in the case of cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining. However, to our 
knowledge, the literature has barely addressed the issue of the difference in spouses’ utility or 
well-being as such. 
                                                 
2 Marriage is considered as a “partnership for joint production and joint consumption”, such as “producing and 
rearing children” (Weiss, 1997). Other justifications for marriage include the existence of couple-specific 
production technology or complementarities/substitutability between goods. Marriage as a long term 
arrangement is also grounded on the benefits yielded by increasing returns to scale, the division of labor, risk 
pooling and improved coordination between spouses (Weiss, 1997).  
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In altruistic household models à la Becker (1974), the head of the household cares for the 
welfare of each member, but not for the equality of welfare among members as such. In 
collective models à la Chiappori (1988, 1992), spouses try to reach the highest collective 
utility frontier, and then choose a point on the frontier to regulate the division. The sharing 
rule depends on their respective preferences and bargaining power (“distribution factors”), 
which depend inter alia on spouses’ outside wage, marriage and divorce legislation, child 
custody rules, or the sex ratio on the relevant (re-)marriage market. But the sharing rule does 
not include a constraint on the degree of equality of outcomes. It is true that: “In general, the 
higher the degree of caring, the narrower will be the range of conflict. That is, both partners 
will agree to delete extremely unequal distributions from the family’s choice set” (Weiss, 
1997, p 93). But this does not mean that caring spouses will necessarily equalize their well-
being. In the case of non-cooperative models, where members are represented as being linked 
by externalities, but acting non-cooperatively, each person determines the variable under her 
control, taking the decision of her spouse as given: the outcome can thus clearly be distributed 
very unequally across spouses, depending on their relative threat points. Finally, couple 
dissolution occurs endogenously when the value of marriage is less than the value of divorce. 
In cooperative models, utility transfers take place until the aggregate utility of the marriage 
falls behind the total utility of divorce. Again, utility gaps do not play any role in this 
decision. This very brief discussion shows that the economic models of marriage do not 
contain any prediction concerning the relation between utility gaps between spouses and the 
risk of divorce.  
However, as underlined by Becker, Landes and Michael (1977, p.1144), in the case of 
cooperative bargaining: “The conclusion that a couple dissolves their marriage if, and only if, 
their combined wealth when dissolved exceeds their combined married-wealth, is a direct 
extension of the conclusion that single persons marry if, and only if, their combined married-
wealth exceeds than their combined single-wealth. Both conclusions assume that the division 
of wealth between spouses is flexible”. By contrast, in the case where utility is not 
transferable, unilateral decision to divorce may happen even when they are not Pareto-
improving. Hence, the non-transferability of utility makes divorce more likely. As a corollary, 
marriages with a very unequal distribution of welfare may be more unstable, because of the 
impossibility to implement transfers of utility that could be Pareto-improving (if preferences 
are “caring”). In the case of non-transferable utility, couples in which spouses are similar can  
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be expected to be more stable, as their similar features reduce the scope of conflicts. Hence, 
when utility is not transferable, positive assortative mating is likely to be favorable to the 
stability of marriage. 
All in all, in the economic models of the household, once actions and sharing of utility are 
realized (depending on the preferences and threat-points of each member), there is no reason 
to expect that the remaining happiness gap should affect the likelihood of divorce. In terms of 
empirical investigation, controlling for the variables that capture the gains to marriage and the 
value of exiting the marriage for each spouse, and the total happiness of the couple, there 
should thus be no statistical association between happiness gaps and divorce. This paper tests 
this prediction. It finds that on the contrary, ceteris paribus, happiness gaps are robustly 
associated with a higher likelihood of a future separation. This result suggests that couples 
who are not willing or not able to realize equalizing utility transfers are less viable than 
otherwise. Our interpretation is that this reflects a concern for the distribution of welfare per 
se.  
This paper naturally belongs to the subset of literature dedicated to marriage, divorce and self-
declared happiness, as measured in household surveys. A series of papers in economics and 
psychology have shown evidence that, as compared to remaining single, marriage has a 
positive impact on mental health (Gove et al., 1983), on physical health (Wilson and Oswald, 
2005), on life satisfaction (Stutzer and Frey, 2004; Zimmerman and Easterlin, 2006) and on 
life expectancy (Gardner and Oswald, 2002; Hu and Goldman, 1990). Stutzer and Frey (2004) 
have shown that the higher happiness of married people is partly due to a selection effect 
(those to-be-married in the future are already happier than those to-remain-single, even before 
they marry), but not entirely. Concerning divorce, using the BHPS, Gardner and Oswald 
(2005) have shown that “divorcing couples become happier by breaking up”. Hu and 
Goldman (1990), in a longitudinal survey, estimated that divorced males have the highest 
ratios of mortality, relative to the married population, in Asian countries, North America and 
Europe. However, this could stem from a selection effect, as Stutzer and Frey (2004) found 
that the lower happiness of divorced people was already observable during their marriage.   
A few papers of the same literature, have tried to address the idea of altruism and intra-
household externalities of welfare. Powdthavee (2004) for instance has shown evidence of 
positive spillovers of subjective well-being among spouses, using the British Household Panel  
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Survey. In a recent paper (2009), he also shows that a negative correlation of spouses’ 
subjective well-being is associated with a higher likelihood of divorce. Lucas and Schimmack 
(2006), using the German Socio-Economic Panel, also find some evidence of spousal 
similarity in life satisfactions. Bruhin and Winkelmann (2008) provide evidence that parents’ 
self-declared happiness is positively correlated with their children’s happiness; more 
“altruistic” parents actually make higher financial transfer payments to their children. 
Finally, this paper belongs to the literature dedicated to the effects of income distribution and 
income comparisons on subjective well-being (see the surveys by Alesina and Giuliano, 2009, 
Clark et al., 2008; and Senik, 2009). The difficulty in identifying the direction, intensity and 
welfare effects of income comparisons has been addressed by an important literature in the 
last decade. Empirical studies have predominantly documented the negative effect of income 
comparisons, except in the case of signal effects whereby people compare to others in order to 
acquire information about their own future prospects. As already noticed, couples represent 
one of the rare real life groups (as opposed to experimental settings) in which researchers can 
be quite certain about the direction of comparisons that potentially occur between agents. 
With respect to this literature, the contribution of this paper is to show evidence of happiness 
comparisons in the realm of within-household interactions. 
The next section presents the data. Section 4 presents the empirical specification. Section 
5discusses the results and Section 6 concludes. 
3. Data 
We use three large panel surveys, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA), which include subjective happiness questions and contain information 
about all adult members within households. Descriptive statistics of the datasets are presented 
in the Appendix. 
Admittedly, the focus of this paper is not on the comparison between Germany, the United-
Kingdom and Australia. Rather, our motivation is that the BHPS and the GSOEP are among 
the main panel datasets that have been used in the happiness literature, so that results obtained 
with both sources will have more generality. We complement these by a more recent data set 
(HILDA) that contains very useful subjective variables. Conducing the same analysis  
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separately on three data sets is a way to include a self-contained “replication check” on the 
validity of the results. Using several datasets also allows relating complementary pieces of 
information. For instance, the GSOEP has information on expected life satisfaction, whereas 
HILDA has, among other things, information about who initiated the divorce.  
3.1 The GSOEP 
The GSOEP
3 is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households, which 
has been conducted annually since 1984. It includes information on objective living 
conditions and many subjective attitudes. Self-declared happiness (“How satisfied are you 
with your life, all things considered?”) is a categorical variable that takes on values 0-10 
(where 0 is “totally unhappy” and 10 is “totally happy”) and is available for every year in the 
survey. GSOEP includes a separate spell dataset for marital status, indicating the beginning 
and ending date of each marriage spell.  
Our regression sample covers the years 1984-2007, and includes 224 758 legally married 
person-years and 28 576 cohabitating person-years. From 1984 to 2007, we have 4074 
separations. 2460 separations are from legally married people and 1614 are from de facto 
relationships. In average, couples are observed for an average duration of 21.2 years (21.9 for 
legally married people and 5.3 for de facto relationships). We also observe 3253 new 
marriages. We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18-65, and we exclude transitions into 
widowhood. Our regression sample thus includes 253 334 observations with a valid partner 
number, i.e. 58 374 individuals. The probability of separation from one’s partner, conditional 
on having a partner in the previous period, is 2.02. 
3.2 The BHPS 
The BHPS is a longitudinal annual household survey that began in 1991
4. The wording of the 
life satisfaction question that we are using is “How dissatisfied or satisfied are you with your 
life overall?” The answers are measured on a scale from 1 (not satisfied at all) to 7 
(completely satisfied). This question about life satisfaction has been asked in all waves since 
                                                 
3 For further information on GSOEP: http://panel.gsoep.de/soepinfo2008/ 
4 Detailed information about the BHPS can be found at htttp://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps  
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1996, with the exception of 2001. Our regression sample contains only people who live with a 
partner for at least one year during the period of observation. We also restrict the sample to 
individuals aged 18–65, and we exclude transitions into widowhood. These restrictions leave 
us with 90 727 person-year observations with a valid partner identifier. These observations 
come from 15 226 individuals. For 1 743 observations (that is, about 2.3% of the sample), we 
observe a break-up. In most of the estimations, we further restrict our sample to married 
couples. In this case, the number of person-year observations is 72  619, for 11  814 
individuals. As is to be expected, the share of separations is lower for married couples, at 
about 1.3%. 
In the BHPS, the (uncensored) length of marriage is only available for a subset of the 
individuals, and only for first marriages. This average length is about 21.1 years. The average 
number of years in which an individual (married or not) is observed with the same partner in 
our sample (conditional on being together in period t) is about 4.1 years. This is of course a 
left-censored measure of the duration of the couple. 
3.3 HILDA 
HILDA is an Australian nationally representative household-based panel study, run annually 
since 2001 in order to collect information on economic and subjective well-being, labor 
market dynamics and family dynamics in Australia
5. Interviews are conducted annually with 
all adult members of each selected household. Respondents declare their level of life 
satisfaction (All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life?  Pick a number 
between 0 and 10 to indicate how satisfied you are.  (0: Totally dissatisfied, 5: Neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied, 10: Totally satisfied). The data has very detailed information on 
relationships and life events that occur in each year. This paper uses the first seven waves of 
the HILDA survey (2001 to 2007). We consider all individuals who have been married or 
living with a partner at least once during the survey and whose partner is also identified. Our 
regression sample contains 25 716 individuals for a total of 90 548 person-year observations. 
From 2001 to 2007, we observe 2865 separations and 1813 marriages. In the survey, couples 
                                                 
5 See http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/  
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are observed for an average duration of 19.5 years (22.7 for legally married people and 4.8 for 
de facto relationships). 
For each survey, we construct two datasets: the sample of women and the sample of men, 
which contain all women (resp. men) who have been married or living with a partner at some 
point during the survey. Each woman (resp. man) is matched with her spouse or partner. Each 
sample contains the information on each women (resp. man) and her spouse or partner.  
In the three databases, women appear to be slightly happier than men.
6 The absolute value of 
the happiness gap between spouses is represented in Graphs A.1.a to A.1.c. in the Appendix. 
In general, in about one third of couples, both spouses declare exactly the same happiness 
level. A difference of one step is observed in over another third of couples. Hence, the 
situation in which spouses equalize their levels of happiness is indeed predominant.  
4. Empirical specification 
Following the existing empirical literature (see Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977; Bumpass 
and Sweet, 1972; Smock, Manning and Gupta, 1999; Weiss and Willis, 1997), we model the 
probability of a separation depending on the value of being in marriage versus out-of-
marriage (household income, education of spouses, children, duration of marriage) and of the 
potential threat points of each spouse (individual income, education, age and age difference 
between spouses, etc.). We are interested in testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the happiness gap is not significant. Our basic specification is the following: 
Separation t+1 = f [total happinesst, absolute value of happiness difference between spousest; 
aget, age differencet, log(household income)t, number of childrent ]     (1) 
                                                 
6 In GSOEP, for the 112811 observations on married women, the difference is 0.035 (significant at 1%) and for 
the 14691 observations on cohabiting women, the difference is 0.039 (significant at 5%). In the BHPS, for the 
32735 observations on married women, the difference is 0.045 (significant at 1%) and for the 6678 observations 
on cohabiting women, the difference is 0.018 (not significant). Finally, in HILDA, for the 23432 observations on 
married women, the difference is 0.118 (significant at 1%) and for the 5368 observations on cohabiting women, 
the difference is 0.074 (significant at 1%).   
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Where Separation t+1 is the probability that a couple observed in year t is dissolved in year 
t+1, and total happinesst is the sum of the self-declared happiness of the spouses in year t.  
Because of collinearity, it is not possible to include husband’s happiness, wife’s happiness 
and the happiness difference between spouses among the explanatory variables. We therefore 
need to recourse to a nonlinear specification of the happiness gap between spouses. Our main 
specification consists in including the absolute value of the happiness gap between a 
respondent and her spouse, together with the total happiness gap. As an alternative 
specification, we also consider dummy variables that take value one if the self-declared 
happiness of the wife is greater (respectively lesser and equal) than that of the husband. In 
robustness analysis, we also use the ratio of the happiness level of the happier spouse to the 
unhappier one, and of the wife to the husband. We estimate these relations on the pooled data, 
using alternatively a probit specification and a fixed-effect logit specification. In the probit 
models, we cluster standard errors by individual, in order to correct for the autocorrelation of 
observations that pertain to the same individual. 
Because we model the probability to divorce, a possibility could be to use a duration model. 
However, Sueyoshi (1995) has shown that a much simpler logit or probit model with period 
specific variables yields similar results. Kraft and Neimann (2009) use a complementary log-
log model with a marriage duration specific dummy variables, which is perfectly equivalent to 
a discrete-time proportional hazard model, but is better suited for the analysis of rare events 
like divorce. We check that our results are maintained with this specification.  
In addition to this basic specific specification, in the robustness analysis, we control for other 
determinants of divorce which have been uncovered by the empirical literature, such as, for 
both spouses: religion, objective and subjective health, BMI, height, duration of marriage, 
country of origin, labor market status, work experience, years of schooling, number of 
working hours, months of previous unemployment, house ownership, number of previous 
legal marriages and cohabitations, management of household budget, share of household 
work, the fact of having had divorced parents, etc. (see for instance Weiss and Willis, 1997). 
We also control for year fixed effects in the probit estimates. 
Of course, this exercise is based on the assumption that spouses compare their level of 
happiness, i.e. that they are able to observe the level of happiness of their spouse. It has 
indeed been shown (Sandvik et al., 1993) that the level of happiness declared by an  
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individual is correlated with the level of happiness that her spouse perceives her to 
experience. To be safe, we run fixed-effect estimates that eliminate any anchoring effect or 
misperception of happiness, that could characterize a couple in an invariant way. 
We present the results based on the sample of women. The same results are obtained on the 
sample of men. For space constraints, we do not reproduce the latter in the text, but we keep 
them available to any interested reader. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1 Happiness gaps increase the likelihood of separations 
Tables 1.a to 1.c present our basic specification estimates. Controlling for the total level of 
happiness of a couple (as well as age, age difference between spouses, number of children and 
log real household income), an increase in the happiness gap by 1% raises the probability of 
separation by 0.24% in Germany (GSOEP), 0.3% in Australia (HILDA) and 0.1% in the 
United-Kingdom (BHPS). Given that the average risk of separation in the samples is about 
1.8%, this represents a non negligible share of the average risk of break-ups. 
Tables 1.a to 1.c about here 
Running the estimates separately on the sub-sample of legally married people versus 
cohabitating couples, we find that the effect of the happiness gap is typically several times 
higher for cohabitating couples than it is for legally married couples. For instance, in 
Germany, an increase of 1 percent in the happiness gap raises the probability of separation by 
0.16% for legally married couples, versus 0.5% for cohabitating couples. In Australia, an 
increase of 1 percent in the happiness gap raises the probability of a break-up by 0.2% for 
legally married couples, versus 0.9% for cohabitating Accordingly, when we introduced a 
dummy variable standing for legally married (versus de facto) couples, the coefficient 
associated to this dummy was always statistically significantly negative (with 1% confidence 
level) and varied from -2% (GSOEP and BHPS) to -5% (HILDA).  In the sequel, in order to 
be conservative, we display the results obtained with the sub-sample of legally married 
couples, and we mention the size of the effect for the rest of the sample in the text. 
In order to understand which couples are most concerned by this effect, we interacted the  
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absolute value of the happiness difference with a large number of variables. (In these models, 
we also included the interacted variables as regressors to capture not only the interaction 
effects, but also the main effects). It turned out that few variables significantly modify the 
effect of the happiness gaps. The statistical association between happiness gaps and the risk of 
divorce was particularly strong for higher levels of female income and for couples where the 
housework load is supported predominantly by women (GSOEP). It was weaker for women 
who declared that they attach a high importance to family (GSOEP, HILDA), to a good 
partnership (BHPS) or to religion (HILDA), and for couples with longer marriage duration 
(HILDA, BHPS). 
The effects of the other controls included in our main specification are consistent with the 
existing literature: the probability of divorce decreases with the log of total real household 
income and with the age of spouses, but increases with the age difference (wife – husband). 
The association between the number of children and marriage stability was most often 
negative but not stable. 
For robustness, we added a series of additional controls to our main specification. The main 
result (i.e. the association between the happiness gap and the probability of divorce) proved 
robust to the inclusion of these controls. Because of space constraints, we cannot report all the 
results in the entire tables; we simply cite the controls that appeared to be statistically 
significantly correlated with the probability of divorce. The most remarkable (but classical) 
result is that the risk of divorce increases with the wife’s individual income but falls with the 
husband’s individual income. Other factors that increase the risk of divorce include self-
employment of the husband, and having divorced parents. Controls that are negatively 
associated with the risk of divorce are situations in which the wife is retired, housewife or 
full-time student (controlling for age), the age at marriage (which is usually taken to capture 
the length of the search, hence the quality of the marriage), spouses being born in the same 
country, sharing the same religion (especially if catholic) owning one’s house (GSOEP, 
HILDA), declaring “a fair sharing of housework” (see also Staunder, 2005 and Kraft and 
Neimann, 2009), couples in which finance are shared or maintained separately rather than 
managed by one spouse only (BHPS), and, of course, own and spouse’s individual happiness  
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and subjective mental health. The effect of education on marriage stability is not stable, 
conformingly to the literature, which posits an a priori ambiguous effect
7.   
We also ran various other robustness tests. In terms of specification, we checked that the 
results show in Tables 1.a to 1.c were left essentially unchanged in a complementary log-log 
specification, as well as in a rare events logit specification. We also checked that the results 
were essentially unchanged when the German sample (GSOEP) was restricted to West 
Germans. As a measure of the happiness gap, we replaced the absolute value of the happiness 
difference with the ratio of wife/husband’s happiness, or of the happier to the unhappier 
spouse. We also replicated all our results using the post-estimation residual happiness 
(including the usual controls as defined in equation 1) instead of the happiness level (see 
Powdthavee, 2009). The results were essentially unaltered. Because of space constraints, we 
do not display all these robustness tests. 
5.3.2 Ruling out reverse causality and other alternative explanations 
We interpret the effect of happiness gaps on divorce as expressing a concern for relative 
happiness. However, we need to rule out alternative interpretations, such as the reverse 
causality running from the expectation of divorce in the near future to the happiness gap. 
Infidelity of one spouse is likely to create such a situation, especially if the infidel spouse is 
planning to dissolve her marriage in order to form another couple with her new partner (South 
and Lloyd, 1995). More generally, reverse causality could stem from a situation in which the 
marriage is failing and the perspective of divorce makes one of the spouses more unhappy 
than the other.  
It could also be the case that an unexpected event affects both spouses differently and 
destabilizes the couple by creating a wedge between the expected value of marriage and its 
realization (Becker et al., 1997). Examples of this include shocks to the expected earning 
                                                 
7 Higher education makes an individual financially less dependent on her spouse, but on the other hand, it 
increases the non monetary gain from marriage due to the valuable characteristics of this person and it also 
reduces the chance that her expectations concerning marriage were false, because of her higher intelligence 
(Kraft and Neimann, 2009).  
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capacity of a spouse (Weiss and Willis, 1997), job losses or health shocks (Charles and 
Stephens, 2004). 
We try to rule out these mechanisms using different methods. First, we control for one to five 
years lagged values of the happiness gap. This is useful if the impact of a shock is likely to be 
felt in the couple of years after it occurs. As shown by Table 2, we do observe a significant 
impact of lagged happiness gaps on the probability to divorce in (t+1).  
Table 2 about here 
However, the effect of shocks, or infidelity, may be more persistent. In order to go as far as 
possible in trying to overcome this problem, we consider the sub-sample of couples who are 
already under observation in the survey in the first year of their marriage. We then look at the 
effect of the absolute value of the happiness gap in the first year of marriage on the 
probability to ever divorce in subsequent years, during the period of observation. Tables 3.a to 
3.c show that an initial happiness gap of 1% increases the probability of divorce in the 
following years by 2.3 percentage points in Germany and Australia, and by 4.3 percentage 
points in the United-Kingdom. This represents 16% percent of the average risk of divorce in 
the United-Kingdom, 7% in Germany and 33% in Australia (as the average probability of 
divorce in the estimation sample is 27% in Great-Britain, 32% in Germany and 7% in 
Australia
8). 
Table 3.a to 3.c about here 
We thus observe a statistically significant effect of happiness gaps in the first year of 
marriage, hence (hopefully) before the occurrence of most shocks. We also checked that our 
main result holds when controlling for shocks to the income and health status of each spouse. 
Introducing such controls did not change the order of magnitude of the coefficient on the 
happiness gap. In the BHPS, disability, unemployment or self-declared health status of either 
spouse did not have a statistically significant impact on the probability to divorce. In the 
                                                 
8 The lower figure for Australia may be due to the fact that in Australia, de facto couples enjoy exactly the same 
rights as married couples after one year of cohabitation. Hence, the selection effect of couples who decide to get 
legally married is certainly high.   
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GSOEP, we used company closures and unexpected disability shocks, which are likely to be 
exogenous events. We found that these were not statistically associated with the probability to 
divorce in later years. Concerning the Australian survey, we used a series of reported life 
events, such as serious personal injury/illness, serious injury/illness to a family member, death 
of child, death of close relative, death of a close friend, being victim of physical violence, 
victim of property crime, detained in jail, fired, retired, major improvement in finances, major 
worsening in finances. All these additional controls did not change the magnitude of the 
coefficient on the happiness gap. 
Finally, concerning the difference between expectations and realizations, we used a series of 
questions of the GSOEP, labelled in the following way: “1. In conclusion, we would like to 
ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer according to the 
following scale: 0 means 'completely dissatisfied', 10 means 'completely satisfied'.  2. And 
how do you think you will feel in five years? 3. How happy were you a year ago with your 
life? 4. And what do you think it will be like in a year's time?” We include the difference 
between current happiness (question 1) and 5-years-lagged expected future happiness 
(question 2); we also include the difference between current happiness (question 1) and one-
year-lagged expected happiness (question 4). Including these additional controls in the main 
specification left our main result unchanged. 
5.3 Assortative mating 
The finding that happiness gaps, even those that are already observable in the first year of 
marriage, are associated with a higher risk of divorce could be interpreted as a sign of 
assortative mating in terms of happiness baseline-level. The economic theory of marriage 
predicts a “predominance of positive assortative mating with respect to personal 
characteristics such as education, height, intelligence, age, property income, physical 
attractiveness, etc. […] all traits which are not good substitutes in the production of 
commodity income, while negative assortative mating would be optimal for substitutes, such 
as wage earning power” (Becker et al., 1977, p1146). This prediction has been confirmed by 
several empirical studies (e. g. Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993; Contoyannis and Jones, 2004; 
Kalmijn 1994; Kalmijn et al., 2005). As an illustration, Weiss and Willis (1997) find evidence 
that couples with similar level of schooling are more likely to marry and less likely to divorce. 
Likewise, similarity in terms of age, region of origin, ethnicity, religion, and social  
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background, have been found to be associated with longer durations of marriages (see 
Frimmel et al., 2009 for a survey), an observation that is confirmed in our surveys (see section 
5.1).  
Matching could also happen along the dimension of well-being. Some psychologists (Lykken 
and Tellegen, 1996; Headey and Wearing, 1992) have suggested that individuals are 
characterized by a «  setpoint  » (or baseline-level) of happiness, considered as a type of 
personality trait, partly determined by genetics. In this view, individuals can deviate from 
their baseline-level following shocks, but will eventually return to this level after a process of 
adaptation. Fujita and Diener (2005) and Lucas and Schimmack (2006) have questioned the 
relevance of this theory using the GSOEP. They found that individual self-declared happiness 
fluctuates significantly across time and is less stable than other objective health measures such 
as weight, body mass index, systolic and diastolic blood pressure and personality traits. 
Nonetheless, we do find some sign of assortative mating in the three datasets that we use.  
First, the happiness levels of spouses are positively correlated. This point is illustrated by 
graphs 1.A to 1.C, and has been established in the literature, in particular by Powdthavee 
(2004) and Lucas and Schimmack (2006). Second, we followed some authors who have 
noticed that individuals remain in a certain zone of the happiness scale most of their lives 
(Davern et al., 2007, Cummins et al., 2008). For instance, people whose declared happiness 
level is under 5 on a 0-10 ladder rarely bypass that threshold; conversely, people whose 
declared level is above 7 rarely fall behind this threshold. Accordingly, we divided the 
samples of couples who are observed in their first year of marriage into three groups, 
depending on their level of happiness in their first year of marriage. We then tabulated the 
cross-distribution of spouses’ happiness in terms of these groups. In Tables A.2.a to A.2.c, in 
the Appendix, the frequencies are particularly high in the diagonal. A majority of women 
appear to be matched with men of the same happiness category. For instance, in the United-
Kingdom, 61% of the highest happiness tier women appeared to be married with men of the 
same category. 48% of women of the intermediate happiness group were married with men of 
the same category. These figures are even higher in Germany and Australia. 
A possible interpretation of the joint findings of (i) assortative mating with regards to well-
being and (ii) the effect of happiness gaps on divorce, could be that utility (or well-being) is 
not easily transferable among spouses. The economics of the household usually assumes that  
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utility transfers are possible, and take the form of income transfers, compromise, or spillovers 
of happiness, i.e. contagion. However, if well-being is not transferable, and if happiness gaps 
matter per se, it is important to choose a partner whose level of well-being is “naturally” on 
the same level as one’s own, either because it is a natural personality trait as such, or because 
both spouses have identical preferences, which lead them to chose similar actions and reach 
similar levels of “primary” happiness (before any redistribution). In this framework, our 
results can be interpreted as a sign of positive assortative matching and limited transferability 
of utility.  
However, assortative mating does not totally explain the effect of happiness gaps on divorce. 
First, we find that, after controlling for the lagged values of the happiness gap, or for the 
initial happiness gap in the first year of marriage, the coefficient on current happiness gap is 
still statistically significant in all surveys
9. Second, we show that the risk of future divorce is 
associated not only with the level of the happiness gap but also with its evolution in time. The 
effect of happiness gaps on divorce holds in fixed-effect logit estimates, which eliminate the 
effect of the time-invariant quality of the match between spouses. Tables 4.a and 4.b show 
that when the happiness gap becomes unfavourable to the wife, this increases the risk of 
divorce (the results are not statistically significant on Australian dataset). Hence, the effect of 
happiness gaps on the risk of divorce cannot be entirely attributed to the initial quality of the 
marriage. 
Table 4.a and 4.b about here 
Finally, in the three datasets, we checked that the happiness gap between former spouses 
decreases with time after divorce (chi2 tests reject the null that the happiness gap is equal 
before divorce and 2 years, 3 years and 4 years after divorce, at 1%). However, admittedly, 
the happiness gap between former spouses always remains statistically significantly higher 
than that of couples who remain married (by a magnitude of 15% to 30% depending on the 
dataset; chi2 tests reject the null that the happiness gap is equal for divorced and married 
couples at 1%). 
                                                 
9 Note that the correlation between current happiness gaps and lagged values is constantly inferior to 0.3.  
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5.4 Asymmetry 
An important observation, which suggests that assortative matching does not entirely explain 
our findings, is that the effect of happiness gaps is asymmetric. Happiness gaps are associated 
to future divorce only when they are unfavourable to women, but not to men. Tables 5.a to 5.c 
show that the situation in which the wife is unhappier than her husband is associated with a 
higher risk of divorce in the following year: by 0.5% in Germany, 0.4% in Australia, and 
0.3% in Great-Britain. Concerning cohabitating couples, the risk is ten times higher. This 
asymmetry holds in the fixed effects estimates, as already shown by Tables 4.a and 4.b. The 
effect is again ten times higher for cohabitating couples.  
Tables 5.a to 5.c about here 
This naturally leads to the question whether divorce is actually initiated by women when they 
are unhappier than their husband. In the 2005, 2006 and 2007 waves, the Australian survey 
contains retrospective information on the person who initiated the separation. The findings are 
impressive: in the sample of female respondents, 60% of women report that they were 
responsible for the decision to separate. Only 16% of women attribute the responsibility to 
their husband and 24% declare that the separation was initiated by both spouses. Surprisingly, 
in the sample of husband respondents, 36% report that the divorce was initiated by their wife, 
27% by themselves and 37% that it was a joint decision. Hence, it does seem that divorces are 
predominantly initiated by women, although the exact proportion is subject to doubt. In the 
case of Germany, a study of the Ministry of the family, realized in 2003, also shows that 
about two thirds of divorces are initiated by women (quoted by Kraft and Neimann, 2009).  
Importantly, the Australian data also reveals that women who report to have initiated divorce 
were actually less happy than husbands
10. By contrast, chi2 tests do not allow rejecting the 
null hypothesis of equality of satisfaction between spouses when the decision to divorce has 
been taken by both spouses or by the husband. This is consistent with the idea that some 
                                                 
10 Their average level of happiness was 6.89 (0.30) versus 7.7 (0.21) for their husband, and the difference is 
significant at the 5% level (chi2 test=0.0104).  
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divorces are initiated by women, not only because they are unhappy, but because they are less 
happy than their husband.  
Are women more subject to happiness comparisons; do they attach more importance to the 
couple as a spillover mechanism; or do they expect more from their marriage than men, as 
opposed to other domains of life? We are unable to answer these questions at this stage. In 
years 2000 to 2007, a special module of the GSOEP, dedicated to youth biography, surveyed 
members of the households aged 16 to 19 years old, i.e. 2805 individuals (each individual 
surveyed only once). Some of the questions shed some light on our results. The survey shows 
that a slightly higher proportion of women expect to get married (70% versus 68% for men) 
rather than to live with a partner (50% versus 53%); however, women less often consider that 
“a partner is necessary to be happy in life” (64% versus 71%). A proportion of 32% of 
women (but only 25% of men) consider that “one can be just as happy without a partner”. 
Women also more often than men declare that “it is all right for a couple with an unhappy 
marriage to get a divorce, even if there are children”, or that “marriage is an outdated 
institution”, and less often agree that “marriage is a lifetime relationship and should never be 
ended” (all these differences are statistically significant). This suggests that the new 
generation of German women do not exclude exit (rather than voice or loyalty) as a possible 
solution in case of marital conflict. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper offers new empirical evidence concerning the existence of happiness comparisons 
between spouses. Conditional on the individual levels of happiness, or on the aggregate level 
of happiness of the couple, a higher happiness difference between spouses reduces the 
stability of their marriage.  
This result is robust to the inclusion of a series of controls that are classically taken to 
determine the stability of marriage. We address the risk of reverse causation by showing that 
the risk of divorce is statistically associated with the happiness gap in the first year of 
marriage (for those who are surveyed in the first year of their marriage). This finding points to 
the potential importance of assortative mating. However, the effect of happiness gaps goes 
beyond assortative mating, as shown by fixed effects estimates that neutralize the invariant 
quality of the match. Moreover, we uncover an asymmetry in the effect of the happiness gap:  
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the latter is a cause of divorce only in the case when the wife is unhappier than her spouse. 
Our interpretation of these findings is that there exists a pure preference for equal 
distributions of well-being in couples, in other words, a comparison of well-being effect 
between spouses (which is particularly strong for women). 
It is possible that couples that are not able to transfer and equalize their happiness levels are 
more at risk of divorce. In many verions of the popular cooperative models of household 
bargaining, partners are represented as taking sequentially decisions in order to maximize 
their joint output (or aggregate welfare) and then distribute it among them. This interpretation 
rests on the assumption that utility is transferable, i.e. that the initial distribution of well-being 
across spouses is easily modifiable, exactly as primary income can be modified by income 
redistribution by the state. However, it may prove difficult to transfer utility between spouses, 
i.e. to modify the primary distribution of happiness that results from their actions. This could 
explain why assortative mating in terms of happiness is associated with a higher stability of 
marriage (because spouses do not need to redistribute utility in this case). This also suggests 
that when spouses “agree” on too unequal a distribution of welfare, this puts the durability of 
their marriage at risk. From this point of view, public policy should avoid giving spouses 
incentives that lead to diverging levels of happiness. Individual income and employment have 
been shown to be among the main determinants of happiness; policies that affect the division 
of labour inside households should keep this in mind.  
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TABLES  
 
1) Basic  specification 
 
 
Table 1.a. GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female 





Table 1.b. HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female 
sample. All couples 
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Table 1.c. BHPS. DProbit estimate of the probability to break-up next year. Female 







Table 2. Lagged values of the absolute value of the happiness gap between spouses 
 
Absolute value of the happiness gap  GSOEP  HILDA  BHPS 
 































Notes Each coefficient (each cell) corresponds to a separate regression, in which the indicated 
lagged happiness gap is introduced in addition to the current absolute value of the happiness gap, 
total happiness and the other usual controls (age, age difference, number of children, log 
household income). The standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the individual level.   
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2)  Divorce and happiness gaps in the first year of marriage 
 
 
Table 3.a  GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER 





Table 3.b  HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER 
observed in the survey. Female sample. Legally married couples. 
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Table 3.c  BHPS. Probit estimate of the probability that a separation is EVER 






3)  Fixed effect estimates of the probability to divorce 
 
 
Table 4.a GSOEP. Xtlogit estimates of the probability to break-up next year.  
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Table 4.b. BHPS. Xtlogit estimates of the probability to break-up next year.  






Table 5.a. GSOEP. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year.  
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Table 5.b. HILDA. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year.  





Table 5.c. BHPS. Probit estimate of the probability to break-up next year.  
  Female sample. Only legally married couples 
 
   33
APPENDIX 
























0 2 4 6 8 10
GSOEP: absolute  value of happiness difference
 























0 2 4 6 8 10
HILDA: absolute  value of happiness difference
   34
Graph A.1.c . BHPS. Absolute value of the happiness gap between spouses. 1996-2007 
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Summary statistics 
 
Table A.1.a. GSOEP. Summary statistics 
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Table A.1.b. HILDA. Summary statistics 
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Table A.1.c. BHPS. Summary statistics 
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Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage 
 
Table A.2.a. GSOEP. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage. 
 Husband's  happiness 
Wife'happiness  1 2 3 
1  29.27 48.78 21.95 
2  4.07 61.05  34.88 
3  1.75 28.55 69.7 
Notes: 1 if self-declared happiness < 5; 2 if happiness = 5, 6, 7; 3 if happiness > 7. 
69.7% of women in the highest happiness group are married with men in the same group (in their first 
year of marriage). 
Table A.2.b. HILDA. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage. 
 Husband's  happiness 
Wife'happiness  1 2 3 
1  16.13 67.73 16.13 
2  6.31 68.2  35.49 
3  3.7 43.92  52.98 
Notes: 1 if self-declared happiness < 6; 2 if happiness = 7, 8; 3 if happiness > 8. 
16.13% of women in the lowest happiness group are married with men in the same group (in their first 
year of marriage). 
Table A.2.c. BHPS. Assortative mating by happiness level in the first year of marriage. 
 Husband's  happiness   
Wife'happiness 1 2 3
1 21.86 50.61 27.53
2 9.6  47.95 42.45
3 4.08  35.36 60.55
Notes: 1 if self-declared happiness < 4; 2 if happiness = 4.5; 3 if happiness > 6.7. 
47.95% of women in the intermediate happiness group are married with men in the same group (in 
their first year of marriage). 
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Correlates of the happiness gap 
 
Table A.5.a. GSOEP 
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Table A.5.b HILDA 
   41
Table A.5.c BHPS.  
 